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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
will not enforce such "contracts," and as a warning of this fact the case
is important. There is no question of policy sufficient to justify extending
contract principles to protect parties from a trap which they themselves
create. The parties who enter into such agreements need only look well
to the drawing thereof and be sure that there are obligations mutually
binding so that the contract will be enforceable. B. L. W., '31.
CRIMINAL LIBEL--INADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE TO EXPLAIN MEANING OF
LIBELOUS STATEMENT.-Defendant was prosecuted for criminal libel based
on a placard paraded by him in front of the Massachusetts State House
bearing the words, "Fuller-Murderer of Sacco and Vanzetti." Held, that
a directed verdict for the defendant was properly refused, since the words
taken in their usual and popular sense import a charge of murder and are
libelous per se. Testimony that the words on the placard were used to
charge only moral responsibility was held properly rejected. Common-
wealth v. Canter (Mass. 1930) 168 N. E. 790.
Certain publications are said to be actionable per se and may be made
the occasion of criminal prosecution-by this is meant that an action will
lie for making them without proof of actual injury because their necessary
consequence would be to cause injury to the person of whom they are
spoken, and therefore injury is to be presumed. Words are to be taken in
that sense in which they would be understood by those who heard or read
them-in other words, it is a question of the natural and obvious meaning
of the words used. Ingalls v. Morrissey (1913) 154 Wis. 632, 143 N. W.
681; Pollard v. Lyon (1875) 91 U. S. 225, 308; Ogden v. Riley (1833) 14
N. J. L. 186.
Words which are apparently actionable in themselves may be rendered
not actionable by the surrounding circumstances. Yakoviche v. Valen-
tukevicius (1911) 84 Conn. 350, 80 Atl. 94. The question is how would
ordinary men of reasonable prudence naturally understand the language.
Herringer v. Ingberg (1903) 91 Minn. 71, 97 N. W. 460. Thus Shakes-
peare has said, "A jest's prosperity lies in the ears of him who hears it."
However positive may be the charge, if it is accompanied by words which
qualify the meaning and show to the bystanders that the act imputed is
not criminal, this is no slander since the charge, taken altogether, does not
convey to the minds of those who hear it an imputation of criminal con-
duct. Brown v. Meyers (1883) 40 Ohio St. 99. This doctrine has led to
many broader extensions. In Bridgeman v. Armer (1894) 57 Mo. A. 528,
it was held that if it appears that the words were used as a mere term of
abuse, and there was in point of fact no imputation of actual theft con-
veyed thereby, there is no cause of action. See also Haynes v. Haynes
(1848) 29 Me. 247; Fawsett v. Clark (1878) 48 Md. 494.
Some jurisdictions seem to cling to a stricter doctrine. The guilt of a
person must be determined by the article itself and the meaning that would
naturally be attributed to the words used therein, whether the hearers be-
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lieved the charge or not. Miller v. Johnson (1875) 79 Ill. 58; Rea v.
Harrington (1885) 58 Vt. 181. Chief Justice Shaw in speaking in Carter
v. Andrews (Mass. 1834) 16 Pick. 1, said, "It is no defense to this action
that the charge could not be true."
Evidence to show motive or malice of accused in making the statement
for which he is prosecuted is admissible. Russell v. State (1919) 169 N. C.
312, 84 S. E. 807. But under the narrow doctrine of some jurisdictions
evidence as to what the accused intended by the alleged libelous article was
held inadmissible under the rule that the meaning is to be gathered by de-
termining what men of ordinary understanding would infer therefrom.
People v. Strouch (1910) 247 Ill. 220, 93 N. E. 126. In a case arising in
Scotland a birth notice printed by a newspaper in good faith and in the
normal course of business was held actionable because of the extrinsic fact,
entirely unknown to the publishers, that the supposed parents had been
married less than a month. Morrison v. Ritchie (1902) 4 Scotch Sess.
Cases (5th ser.) 645. Morrison v. Smith (1903) 83 App. Div. 492, 82 N. Y.
S. 111; Switzer v. Anthony (1922) 71 Colo. 291, 206 Pac. 391; Farley v.
Evening Chronicle (1905) 113 Mo. A. 216, 87 S. W. 565. If the plaintiff
may show the applicability to him and their defamatory character as de-
termined by extrinsic facts, there is no reason why the defendant should not
be accorded the same right.
The rejection of the evidence offered by the accused in the principal case
presents an utter anomaly, and indicates that an unhealthy provincialism
dominated the Massachusetts court. It is hardly probable that the language
of the publication, in the light of the sorry history of the Sacco-Vanzetti af-
fair, was. calculated to induce those who read it to believe that the person
of whom it was written was guilty of a crime. It was plainly criticism and
abuse of the governor. E. S., '31.
INHITANC--EFFEcT OF LEGITImATING STATUTE.-An interesting case
which shows the way the law develops is In re Cross (1929) 197 N. C. 334,
148 So. 456, in which the claimant sought to share in the estate of his uncle.
It was admitted that he was born out of wedlock, but he claimed the benefit
of the statute legitimating bastards. "When the mother of a bastard child
and the reputed father of such child subsequently intermarry . . . the
child shall, in all respects after such intermarriage, be deemed legitimate
and entitled to all rights in the estate of its father and mother that it would
have had had it been born in lawful wedlock." N. C. Code (1927) sec. 279.
The court held that such a statute did not entitle the child to inherit from
ancestors beyond the father and mother. Inasmuch as the statue is in
derogation of the common law it should be strictly construed.
At common law a bastard was said to be filius nullius. He could not in-
herit from any one, and none could inherit from him except his direct
descendants, nor did subsequent marriage of his parents remove this dis-
ability. The law has nov been changed generally by statute. Kale's CASES
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